This information was found on Great War Forum and the poster has asked that the it is credited to the Museum of Liverpool.
Frederick Callow, a seaman, enlisted in Bootle on the 5th November 1915 as no 5299 in the 7th (Territorial) Battalion of the King's (Liverpool) Regt - in early 1917 he was renumbered to 267202. At the time of his enlistment he was living at The Hollies, Lower Lane, Fazackerley, Liverpool. He crossed to France on an unknown date as a reinforcement for the 1st/7th Battalion (which had arrived in France on 8 March 1915). Probably as a result of being wounded or falling ill he left the 1st/7th and on recovering was transferred to the 13th Battalion and was killed in action on 16th August 1916 - one of 74 officers and men of the Battalion who lost their lives that day mainly by enemy machine guns. He was initially listed as missing - his death was officially accepted as occurring on 16 August. As his remains were never found and identified his name is listed amongst the missing on the Thiepval Memorial with 63 of his comrades who died that day. His name does not appear on any known war memorial on Merseyside and he may be commemorated in the Manchester area.
Transcribed from 13 KLR War Diary
Report on the operations between the 15th and 20 August 1916 in which the 13th KLR were engaged.
On the 13th August 1916 the above Battalion was ordered from the SANDPITS to move up into the front line and to assist in an attack on a position between the south of the village of GUILLEMONT on the left to WEDGE WOOD on the right. Their position was the point assigned to the whole (9th) Brigade. This Battalion had a section of their front from the left of the T track (T25c) 57CSW to BIA 06 (62CNW) we had the Royal Fusiliers on our left flank and the King's Own on our right flank. The first line of trenches was held by 2 Companies of my Battalion with two companies in support in trenches behind the two Companies in the front line. Went into their trenches on the morning of the 14th where they were employed in digging and strengthening their trenches and also in improving the trench on the right portion of the position this they were at until the morning of the 16th.
The two companies in support came up into their support trenches on the morning of the 16th they had previously camped at TALUS BOISE. The attack was ordered for 5.40 p.m. on the 16th inst., and my order for attack was 'A' and 'B' Companies in first and second lines, 'C' and 'D' Companies in support, third and fourth lines, and in this formation they advanced over the parapet. 'A' Company's line of advance (on the left) was 4.9 (T.25.c.4.9) map 57SW, (The point "4.9 (T.25.c.4.9)" was a junction of German trenches north east of "A" Company.) 'B' Company's line of advance was LONELY Trench. They had instructions to keep touch with each other and also with those on the flanks and to advance as far as possible in a general line and to be very careful to afford mutual support wherever required; `C' and `D' Companies (in support) received similar orders. The attack itself was well planned, but unfortunately our artillery fire (although extremely intense) was not evidently directed on the correct places, for as soon as the men rose over the parapet of their trenches they were met by a murderous machine-gun fire from the flanks and front, which it was quite impossible to get through, with the result that practically no progress could be made and the casualties were extremely heavy. My men faced the position most gallantly (as the casualties show) but their task was impossible, and although the supports bravely backed the first line up it was useless and impossible to advance, and they had to fall back into their original front line, where they remained until relieved by the West Yorks. On the 17th inst., when the battalion occupied the Swanson and Maltz Horn trenches. I must mention now that on the 17th our first-line trenches were heavily shelled by our own artillery, which, I am sorry to say, caused forty casualties in the battalion. We also received messages on the 16th that shells were falling in our support trenches. We held the communication trenches before-mentioned till relieved by the 2nd Royal Scots at 2 p.m. on the 18th inst., when we moved to Talus Boise and there went into bivouacs for the night and moved into trenches near Carnoy on the 19th morning and remained till relieved the same evening, when we moved to the Citadel for the night of the 19th. On the morning of the 21st we moved to Ville-sur-Ancre, where we are at present. The only remarks I have to make on the above operations are that I consider that the position we had to attack was insufficiently reconnoitred beforehand, and that the enemy's positions were insufficiently (unreadable) by artillery fire: the most essential places to be demolished by their fire appear to have been left alone with the result that the infantry came in for their machine gun fire when they advanced to attack. Attacks of this description require a long and thorough reconnaissance beforehand and take several days artillery bombardment in order to ensure that the points of attack had been broken up, otherwise the infantry advance is useless. The attack on the 14th July was carefully arranged beforehand with the result that it was a great success.
Major CH Seton
OC 13 KLR
22 August 1916
The following is transribed from the Regimental History by Wyrall:-
THE FOURTH ATTACK [ON GUILLEMONT]
Hardly had the 3rd Division taken over the line from the 55th Division on the night of the 14th/15th August when the former was ordered to prepare for another attack (the fourth) on Guillemont, the attack to take place on the 16th. The 76th Brigade was to be on the right and the 9th Brigade on the left, the 8th Brigade in reserve. Of the 9th Brigade the 13th King's were to attack on the right and the 4th Royal Fusiliers on the left.
The frontage of attack allotted to the 3rd Division was practically a semi-circle running from the ravine on the right (to be attacked by the French) to a German strong point in the sunken road just east of Arrow Head Copse. (In co ordinates given as from B.I.a.3.0 on the right to S.30.b.7.2 on the left.) Within this semi circle the assaulting troops of the two brigades were to go forward, open to enfilade fire from both flanks, and (from what was certain to be heavy fire) from a double line of trenches in front. The French were attacking the Ravine and Angle Wood on the right, and the 24th Division was to assault the enemy's positions on the left of the 3rd Division.
"It had now become evident, however," relates the official despatches after the failure of the previous attack, "that Guillemont could not be captured as an isolated enterprise without very heavy loss, and accordingly, arrangements were made with the French Army on our immediate right for a series of combined attacks to be delivered in progressive stages, which should embrace Maurepas, Falfemont Farm, Guillemont, Leuze Wood and Ginchy."
The sketch maps with the Brigade and Divisional Diaries demonstrate the difficult nature of the task before the 3rd Division, for the whole of the Divisional front bulged outwards. Just north of the left of the left flank of the division the enemy's trenches ran almost from east to west. Opposite the centre was an advanced German trench with open flanks - Lonely Trench it was called - irregularly sited, difficult to observe, and could not, in its most important parts, be bombarded by our heavy artillery without clearing our own front line of troops. This trench was known to be strongly held by infantry with numerous machine guns and protected by wire entanglements. The northern half of this trench was in the line of the attack of the 13th King's.
"The attack," stated Major C. H. Seton, commanding 13th King's, "was ordered for 5.40 p.m. on the 16th inst., and my order for attack was `A' and `B' Companies in first and second lines, `C' and `D' Companies in support, third and fourth lines, and in this formation they advanced over the parapet.
Company's line of advance (on the left) was 4.9 (T.25.c.4.9), (The point "4.9 (T.25.c.4.9)" was a junction of German trenches north east of "A" Company.) `B' Company's line of advance was Lonely Trench. They had instructions to keep touch with each other and also with those on the flanks and to advance as far as possible in a general line and to be very careful to afford mutual support wherever required; `C' and `D' Companies (in support) received similar orders."
At "Zero" hour the battalion held the following positions: "B" Company was in Assembly Trench with "C" Company in rear in Edward Trench; "A" was in "T" Trench with "D" Company in Harrison Trench. "A" and "B" Companies had been ordered to go forward in half companies, the remaining half companies following at from sixty to eighty yards distance.
The attack was launched punctually at 5.40 p.m., and once again into the inferno the King's men went. The Battalion Diary gives no details of the attack, the only entry therein on 16th August being "Made attack on German lines south of Guillemont. Casualties heavy." But there is a report of the operations, written by the C.O. - Major Seton - with the 9th Brigade Diary, and it is given in full as no paraphrase could possibly catch the spirit or atmosphere of a contemporary narrative:
"The attack itself was well planned, but unfortunately our artillery fire (although extremely intense) was not evidently directed on the correct places, for as soon as the men rose over the parapets of their trenches they were met by a murderous machine gun fire from the flanks and front, which it was quite impossible to get through, with the result that practically no progress could be made and the casualties were extremely heavy. My men faced the position most gallantly (as the casualties show) but their task was impossible, and although the supports bravely backed the first line up it was useless and impossible to advance, and they had to fall back into their original front line, where they remained until relieved by the West Yorks. On the 17th inst., when the battalion occupied the Swanson and Maltz Horn trenches. I forgot to mention that on the 17th our first line trenches were heavily shelled by our own artillery, which, I am sorry to say, caused forty casualties in the battalion. We also received messages on the 16th that shells were falling in our support trenches. We held the communication trenches before mentioned till relieved by the 2nd Royal Scots at 2 p.m. on the 18th inst., when we moved to Talus Boise and there went into bivouacs for the night and moved into trenches near Carnoy on the 19th morning and remained till relieved the same evening, when we moved to the Citadel for the night of the 19th. On the morning of the 21st we moved to Ville sur Ancre, where we are at present." (The losses of the 13th King's in the attack on 16th are given in the appendices to the 9th Brigade Diary as: 6 officers and 95 other ranks killed, 4 officers and 251 other ranks wounded and 33 other ranks missing - a total of 10 officers and 379 other ranks. The names of the officers killed are not given.)
Major Seton's remarks concerning the inaccuracy of the artillery fire must be read in conjunction with other notes by the same officer on the reasons of failure - the lack of adequate time for thorough reconnaissance. The gunners were just as unacquainted with the enemy's exact dispositions as were the infantry, and it is possible that Lonely Trench could not be properly observed by the artillery observing officers. Had several days been given the 3rd Division in which to make thorough preparations for the attack, the result might have been far different.
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